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Padre Francisco Fernandes, Macau

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# Relationships between Estado da India,Macau and Timor, After the occupation of Malaca by Dutchs in 1641.

Driven by the dreams and desire of discovering a new World beyond the horizon of old Europe and prompted by the zeal to spread the gospel among the heathens, Portugal of XV century, created the conditions to be the first European maritime power to venture into unchartered waters in the quest of unkown world

After exploring the coasts of Africa for years ,the Portuguese sailors were in conditions to reach the Indian Ocean . In fact their efforts were culminated by what they want
the discovery of the sea route to India.

Once in India they continued to sail towards the East, building a chain of fortified outposts , in an attempt to protect the navegation and sea routes between several entrepots, situated between Goa and Malaca and linking Macau and Timor through the Archipelago of Insulindia

By the beginning of 17 century, Malaca was by far the most important emporia port of Portuguese sea-borne empire.
Malaca was the main sea terminal which offered facilities of anchorage, warehousing, banking, provision of assured market.both in goods brought or sought after by visiting ships to the merchants sailing from Indian Ocean or South China seas and Insulindia Archipelago (1)
Malaca was a sort of meeting place or rendezvouz for all traders and sailors from west and east: Tamil,Marathi,Gujarati, Mappilas,Chinese, Arabs, Malaians,Javanese, Macassares ,local Muslims and Kun luns all had contributed to create a fabulous market where Portuguese merchants could find Asian commodities such as silk and porcelain from Chine, silver from Nagasaki , spices such as pepper,cloves from Insulindia Archipelago,and sandalwood from Timor.
Equiped with the information given by local traders and sailors , the Iberians continue to sail towards the Orient.
They explored the coast of Chine ,Japan,Insulindia and finally Timor Island even Australia.

*They established an unprecedent commercial network which for the first time linked Atlantic, Indian Ocean and the South coast of Chine where the Portuguese had a trade settlement, called Macau which became Commercial Revolution in 16th century.*

*Macau enjoyed the prosperities, since the Portuguese merchants used it as an entrepôt , to where they brough luxury goods from around the world to Canton (Guangzhou) in China.*

*This trade network consisted of trading circuit which linked Africa to* ***Estado da India*** *, Cochin, the Corommandel Coast ,Malaca, Macau, Canton, Nagasaki, Manila- Macassar-Flores-Solor-Timor through which, the Portuguese* ***galeões e naus*** *dominated the sea and trade routes.*

*They were the main intermediary merchants to exchange the silk and porcelain from China with the silver from Nagasaki or Manila,*
*It was popular in these ports the presense of the Big and Great Ship from Amacon, the Black Ship ,according to Charles Boxer.*
*And the Portuguese merchants controlled as well the lucrative trade of spices and sandlewood from Timor*

*But by the midst of 17 century the* ***Lusitana*** *presence in the Orient was challenged by the arrival of other European powers ,mainly Netherlands which regarded Portugal as part of Spanish empire.*

*As consequence of this Iberian political conexion, the Dutch presence in Asian waters singled the turning point for Portuguese maritime hegemony in the seas of southern hemisphere.*

*VOC (****Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie)*** *or East India Companies became extremely agressive against the Portuguese sea-borne empire, being it in Africa, in Brasil and mainly in Asia*

*The Dutch navy concentrated its attention on Malaca, the most fabulous Portuguese entrepôt in Asia and finally conquered it in 1641*

*As consequence of the loss of Malaca, Portugal^s capability of contrololling navegation routes started to decline and its entrepôts in the Far East like Macau and Timor lived in an atmosphere of isolation from* ***Estado da India*** *and Portugal.*
*The Strait of Malaca ceased to be a friendly water to Portuguese seamen who had to pay a tribute to the new owners: The Dutchs. (2)*
*Some times the goods were confiscated which made hard the life of Portuguese merchants who had to avoid the Malaca Strait and sailed by another sea route more expensive*

## *The Relationship Between Macau and Timor During the Critical Period of Portuguese Sea-Borne Empire History (1620-1769)*

*Portugal was forced to review its maritime trade strategy in the far East so that Macau and Timor would be able to survive within the framework of Portuguese sea-borne empire, because after the loss of Malaca,Macau and Timor had to rely on their own political and military resources.*

*For this purpose, new measures had been implemented from XVII century till the middle of XVIII century and they had proved to be very efficient to ensure the Portuguese sovereignty in Macau and Timor during a critical time of Portuguese History*

*One of the measure was that in order to avoid the loss of its commercial fleet from the raids made by Dutch navy, Macau had to replace the big ships such as* ***galeão and nau*** *by small ones less expensive but speedier and equipped with efficient weaponry, like,* ***fusta, galeota,and pataxo*** *(3)*

*Some diplomatic initiatives had been taken to safeguard the interests of Portuguese in Insulindia*
*People like Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo had done successful diplomatic activities in order to conquer the sympathy of Sultan of Macassar which apart from Batavia ( capital of Dutch maritime empire) was one of the most important trading center in Insulindia (4)*

*Thus the Portuguese enjoyed special privileges in business and trade in Macassar*
*The trade of sandal wood of Timor which up to that time was under the control of* ***Senado de Macau*** *and monopolized by the Crown was granted to private enterprise or independent merchanst, including Chinese or other foreing sailors, adventurers , mercenaries all registered as Macau -based-merchants.*

*All the measures abovementioned were put into practice in order to balance the threat posed by the Dutch navy, which initially appeared as normal mercantile vessels ended up to be government force having a clear strategy to drive the Portuguese, Chinese and local Muslims alike out from the lucrative market of sandalwood which had a high price in Chine*

*At the same time to incite the Timorese* ***Liurais*** *or* ***rajahs*** *to dislodg Portuguese from Timor , since these* ***Liurais*** *by nature were very turbulent and independent .*
***« The Timorese retain their independence virtually,and appear to despise as well dislike would-be rulers. Whether Portuguese or Dutch. The Island is adhered between a host of pety rajahs, turbulent and insular,hating foreigners (5)***

*Before the seize of Malaca by the Dutch in January 1641, VOC had made repeated raids against Macau, but without success.*
*As VOC desperately needed a trading entrepot in the Coast of China, on June 1622 a strong Dutch fleet, composed of the best vessels of Dutch Almiralty in the Orient, sailed from Batavia towards Macau and attacked it on 24 of June.*
*But the the invader forces were completely destroyed by the defenders. This Portuguese victory was a good lesson for the Dutch Almiralty in the Orient, because since then Netherlands dared not attack again Macau.*

*The failure of the Dutch navy to seize Macau prompted the Dutch Almiralty to drive Portuguese merchants and their allies Chinese out from Insulindia Arhcipelago*

*So years later, the Dutch occupied Macassar.*
*And the Portuguese sailors and merchants chose Solor and Larantuca in the island of Flores as their headquarter and at the same time fortified their position in Lifau(Timor)*
*If the Dutch had superiority on the sea ,it seemed that they failed to exert influence over local population.*
*And the Portuguese took advantages on this regards, since they had a strong Macanese Community in the Lesser Sunda Islands, apart from* ***mestiços and Larantuaqueiros****.*
*Even the Chinese smugglers and Dutch deserters like the Comanders Jean de Hornay, Jan Thomaszoon and others were on the side of Portuguese. (6)*

*But the fundamental reason of the Portuguese influence was the fact that the presence of Dominicans in Lesser Sunda and Timor was more than one century so obviously it had deep influence on the Timorese and the population of lesser Sunda Islands*
*On the other hands, when Dutch realized that they were not able to compete with Macanese ,Chinese and other Macau-based- merchants, in the Timorese market, they decided to seize Solor in 1628 and occupied a base in west Timor (Kupang) in 1653.*
*Till this time-1653,apart from Macau, there was no any Portuguese Governor in Insulíndia.*
*Giving the occupation of a part of Timor by Dutch, the Dominicans and the* ***Liurais ( traditional leaders)*** *of Timor requested the* ***Vice Rey do Estado da India*** *to appoint a Governador to Timor.*
*The reluctance on the part of* ***Vice Rey*** *to do so, gave rise to a struggle between two rival* ***Liurais*** *families : Hornay and Da Costa to control the power as Governador of Timor.*

*Finally* ***Liurai*** *António Hornay was on the up hand and ruled Timor and Solor for more than 20 years. With the death of António Hornay , his family influence was in decline. (7)*

*And at last there was an agreement between the two rival families : Hornay and Da Costa based on the wedding between Francisco Hornay (António brother) and a grand-daughter of Mateus da Costa.*

*Taking advantage of this favourable situation the* ***Vice Rey da India*** *appealed to the strong Macanese Community in Solor to influence the* ***Liurais*** *in order to accept a Governor appointed by* ***Vice Rey****.*
*The Macanese were welcome by the* ***Liurais*** *of Lifau , because apart from trading ties, one Macanese, called Lourenço Lopes married one of the daughter of* ***Liurai*** *Mateus da Costa.*

*All these relationships seemed to pave the way to the acceptance on the part of the* ***Liurais*** *a Governador appointed by* ***Vice Rey***

*Within this context, a former Governor of Macau, a Macanese called ANTÓNIO MESQUITA PIMENTEL sailed from Macau to Timor, on the* ***Fragata Nossa Senhora da Conceição de Pangim*** *in 1695 as the first governor of Timor and Solor ( 8)*

*The Governor Pimentel was welcome with enthusiasm by the population in Lifau(Oecusse-Timor) ,but as the Timorese were acostumed for centuries to live a free and independent life, they were not happy that their way of living being conditioned and restricted by laws.*
*Another Macanese,ANDRÉ COELHO VIEIRA, also a former Governor of Macau was appointed to replace Pimentel. But Vieira had the same fate.Was not successful in his office. (9)*
*Once again the* ***Vice Rey*** *Luís Câmara Coutinho, asked the* ***Liurais*** *to accept the appointed governar .So did the Macanese Community in Larantuca*

7.

*Then ANTÓNIO COELHO GUERREIRO was appointed by* ***Vice Rey*** *of India as Governar and General Captain of the Islands of Timor and Solor and all the regions in the South.*

*Guerreiro left Goa a little desapointed because he did not receive the force that he needed.*

*Once in Macau he could arrange what he needed, soldiers, supplies , provisions and two frigates and sailed to Timor and Solor.*

*Despite the opposition offered by* ***Liurai*** *Domingos da Costa, with the help of a contingent of 240 men on the bord of three frigates-****Nossa Senhora das Neves; Nossa Senhora dos Prazeres and Santo António,***

*Guerreiro was able to land in Lifau(Timor) on February 1703 which marked the formal occupation of Timor, by the Portuguese Crown, after more than one century since the arrival of first Portuguese in the Island (10).*

*Once in Timor Governor Guerreiro asked Macau to send more force and provisions for maintenance of order and piece.*

*So did Macau by sending the ship* ***Boas Novas****. The supports from Macau exceeded the expectation of everyone to the point to cause sensibility to the former Governor* ***Liurai*** *António Hornay to offer to the* ***Senado de Macau*** *valuable products of Timor (11)*

*According to the world known historian of Portuguese Sea-borne Empire, Charles Boxer:*

***«During the critical time in Timor History, Macau never failed to help Timor, whenever Timor needed the help » (12)***.

*Guerreiro, as supported by the forces from Macau he had opportunity to proved to be a governor of great political vision.*

*Giving the fact that Dutch forced continued to harass Portuguese presence in Lifau(Timor) , in order to avoid a fatal blow on it he started to to implement a policy* ***for winding the mind and the heart of the people*** *,since he found the Timorese society well structured in terms of political and social organizations. He had just adapted to the prevailing organizations which wre based on experiences for many centuries.*

*He understood that the best way to rule Timor was to rely on local resources.*
*So the Governor started the campaign among the- **Liurais**- by saying that the Governor was just the big brother and all of **Liurais** were the brothers of King of Portugal, so all had to joind their forces a goodwill to defend Timor against the any foreing invaders.*
*Then the governor granted the military ranks to the **Liurais**. Some with the ranks of brigadier, others colonel, or captain according to their hierarchy*
*So **Liurais** continued to rule their kindgdoms on behalf of King of Portugal.*
*This policy was regarded as the best way to maintain Timor as territory of Portuguese sea-borne Empire, because concerning the defense of Timor, giving the distance from Portugal or **Estado da India**, theTimorese **Liurais** could perform this duty because they had their own private army or para-military forces.*
*And the History proved that the policy implemented by the Governor Guerreiro survived till the modern time.*

*On the part of Netherlands, despite the treaty of Peace signed by Portugal and the United Provinces, continued to harass the Portuguese presence in this part of the Worl*

## *CONCLUSION*

*Bearing in mind that VOC possessed a superior naval force and a sound financial supports;*
*And bearing also in mind that, VOC had power to impose its will to Asian rulers and to exclude European competitors from the Indies and to control Asian markets ;*
*it was expected that VOC would dominate interasian sea routes market and would expel the Europeans , mainly Portuguese from their outposts*

*An assessment of overall implication of VOC in trading monopoly in Timor market as well as in territorial dispute against Portugal it seems to be counterproductive to VOC own interests.*
*In another word,VOC strategy failed to achieve its goals:*

*1- The monopoly of the sandalwood market;*
*2- The expulsion of Portuguese merchants and its allies from the lucrative trading routes;*
*3--- And finally to wipe out Portuguese from Timor.*

*VOC efforts to seek for a commercial base on the coast of Chine, ended up with a devastating blow, when VOC decided to occupy Macau. This blow had a far-reaching consequence because since that time VOC never again was able to have a commercial base (temporary or permanent) on the Coast of Chinese Mainland .*

*Concerning to the Timor, VOC aggressive policy prompted* ***Vice Rey da India*** *to appoint a Governor to Solor and Timor.*

*It meant that from that time Timor was in better conditions to resist to any aggression from VOC, even conditioned and controlled VOC activities.*

*In terms of trading, VOC failed to reap the profits as expected. Because VOC could not compete with Macau- based -merchants who better than any one knew which commodities were highly appretiated by supplier market of sandalwood.*

*The Timorese appretiated commercial items such as chopping knives,small bugles, porcelain, coloured taffaties,and pieces of silver.etc.*

*Accordingly the bulk of the sandalwood was bought by Macau-based-Merchants.*

*And on the other hand as VOC had no any trading outpost on the Coast of China so was unable to have access to the Chinese market where sandalwood was highly appretiated.*

*VOC was forced to look for Netherlands market where there was no any interest in sandalwood.*

*As Adriaan Van Der Velde bewailed in 1614 after its first capture from the Portuguese:*

***«The Chinese offer in exchange such articles as porcelain,beads,golds,etc,which are in great demand on Timor and which the Ducht cannot compete.***
***In addition they offer the people of Timor more than we do, since all the wares in China are abundant and cheap » (12).***

*According to the account of Dominican Miguel Rangel, Macau-based Merchants reaped profits as high as 200 per cent on the sandalwoo trade.*

*The Dominican fort in Solor assured the free access of Macau- based merchants to Timor^s sandalwood, apart from the support of religious and mercantile communities living in the islands of Lesser Sunda for more than century*
*Regarding to the struggle between Portuguese and Dutch, Bocarro, the chronicler-in-chief of the* ***Estado da India registed:***

*«...however the Portuguese always come off best,for since those of Macao are wealthy and not lacking in artillery,their pinnaces are very well found,whilst the soldiers they take on in Solor are very good, and fight very resolutely against the Dutch»*
***-António Bocarro-Descrição da Cidade do Nome de Deus na China-1635 in C.R. Boxer,Macau na Época da Restauração-(13)***

***Dispite the superiority of VOC in terms of military forces,finance and human resources to wipe out Portuguese presence in the Orient, Macau and Timor managed to survive.***

***It was possible thanks to the goodwill of Senado de Macau, the experiences of its merchants who risked their lives whenever there was potential profits combined with the endurance***
*of the communities of mestiços and topasses and tenacity of Dominicans .*

MACAU, 6/6/000

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